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Dealing with Trans-Territorial Executive 
Rule-Making 
Herwig C.H. Hofmann* 
ABSTRACT 
This Article discusses the reality of executive rule-making procedures 
with trans-territorial effect, with other words, the creation of non-legislative 
rules which have an effect outside the territorial limits of the jurisdiction of 
origin. It maps the phenomenon, discusses some of its central challenges for 
the realization of general principles of law and considers possible legal ap-
proaches addressing these. One of the most important issues thereby is to find 
workable solutions in the context of the pluralism of sources of law – na-
tional, supranational and international. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Executive rule-making is characterized by the creation of acts which, al-
beit often legislative in character, do not follow a formal parliamentary legis-
lative process. Executive rule-making powers are generally powers delegated 
to administrative bodies and institutions or, for example in the area of stan-
dard setting, hybrid public-private actors. In many instances, rule-making 
powers are also delegated to supranational or international bodies. This is a 
phenomenon not only in the quasi-federal system of the European Union but, 
as further discussed in this article, a reality in many areas such as interna-
tional environmental law setting rules on fisheries, forestry and air pollution 
as well as in mattes such as food safety with the codex alimentarius or bank-
ing regulation with standards being set by the Basel committee. Such delega-
tion, in turn, often in practice leads to an almost mandatory application of the 
content of foreign rules in the domestic legal system – both in the form of 
rules established on the international or supranational level, as well as in the 
form of mutual recognition and enforcement of rules established in foreign 
jurisdictions. Examples for such obligations arise from the WTO’s TBT and 
SPS agreements. An important phenomenon of modern public law is thereby 
the permeation of the link between rule-making and the territorial reach of the 
law of a jurisdiction.1  This Article therefore discusses various aspects and 
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consequences of the phenomenon of de-territorialization of executive rule-
making. 
At issue is whether there are any standards for trans-territorial rule-
making which could ensure compliance with key values of public law such as 
the rule of law, respect for fundamental rights, participatory forms of govern-
ing, and accountability of actors.  In recent years, much thoughtful scholar-
ship has been developed on “global administrative law”.  This scholarship 
seeks to understand the regulatory framework of international administrative 
cooperation as well as international organizations active in matters tradition-
ally regarded as matters belonging to administrative law.2  But these discus-
sions also pre-date the coining of the phrase “global administrative law” in 
the academic literature.  Many of the more traditional concepts addressing 
aspects of public law that transcend the territorial reach of public law have 
already been questioned in the context of the discussion of transnational law.3  
“Transnational law” is a term which is slightly misleading when it comes to 
public law,4 because the link between the law and its applicability is not the 
  
 1. The reach of public law of a jurisdiction is generally limited, according to the 
traditional notion of territoriality under public international law, to the territory of that 
jurisdiction.  See Sarah H. Cleveland, Embedded International Law and the Constitu-
tion Abroad, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 225, 229 (2010).  
 2. See generally, e.g., 9 GERMAN L.J. 1375 (2008) (featuring thirty articles on 
the exercise of public authority by international organizations); 68 L. & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 1 (2005) (featuring twelve articles on the emergence of global and administra-
tive law); see also Publications, INST. FOR INT’L L. & JUST., N.Y. UNIV. SCH. OF L., 
http://iilj.org/publications/GlobalAdministrativeLawSeries.asp (last visited Apr. 14, 
2013) (hosting a working paper series on global administrative law).  Single articles 
have also been published on the topic.  See, e.g., Carol Harlow, Global Administrative 
Law: The Quest for Principles and Values, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 187 (2006).  For more 
in depth discussion, see Sabino Cassese, Administrative Law Without the State? The 
Challenge of Global Regulation, 37 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POLITICS 663 (2005); B.S. 
Chimni, Co-option and Resistance: Two faces of Global Administrative Law, 37 
N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POLITICS 799 (2005); Benedict Kingsbury, The Concept of 
“Law” in Global Administrative Law”, 20 EUR. J. INT’L L. 23 (2009) [hereinafter 
Kingsbury, Global Administrative Law]; Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch, & Richard 
B. Stewart, The Emergence of Global Administrative Law, 68  L. & CONTEMPORARY 
PROBLEMS 15 (2005); Andrew D. Mitchell & John Farnik, Global Administrative 
Law: Can It Bring Global Governance to Account?, 37 FED. L. REV. 237 (2009).  
 3. The term was introduced into the mainstream legal debate by PHILLIP C. 
JESSUP, TRANSNATIONAL LAW (1956).  In the following years, the debate regarding 
rule-making had remained in a conflicts of law setting under the concept of the di-
chotomy between international administrative law (as the national law of conflicts in 
administrative matters) as well as on public international law governing international 
organizations. 
 4. The notion of transnational actually seems to have arson in the context of and 
as counterpart to “international law.”  Craig Scott, “Transnational Law” as Proto-
Concept: Three Conceptions, 10 GERMAN L.J. 859, 865-66 (2009).  This was a further 
development of the “law of nations” which in effect is “inter-state law.”  Id.  He how-
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“nation” given that many states are composed by multiple nations but the 
territorial reach of a jurisdiction. For this reason, focusing on executive rule-
making outside of states, this Article uses the more precise but less common 
term “trans-territorial.”  In any case, “transnational” and “trans-territorial” 
both look specifically at those matters which “trans”-cend the traditional di-
chotomy of distinguishing between national versus international law and a 
clear delimitation of these spheres.  The reality what one might describe as 
post-Westphalian5 trans-territorial public law is that it transcends territorial 
limits of jurisdictions. The jurisdictional reach appears increasingly more akin 
to a continuum in which the purely national and the purely international – i.e., 
inter-state – are the two extremes of a range instead of a strict dichotomy.6  
Many options of the exercise of public powers lie in-between, and this Article 
focuses on these areas.   
The concepts and consequences of this phenomenon discussed in this 
Article are mainly illustrated with the help of examples from the law of the 
World Trade Organization (WTO).  Not only is the WTO probably the best 
known international structure to many readers, but it also offers a rich pallet 
of examples due to the complexity of topics addressed within the WTO and 
the relative maturity of its legal order.  WTO law promotes the two phenom-
ena of trans-territorialized rule-making: First, WTO law not only itself sets 
rules complied with by the WTO member states, but it also, second, requires 
that its members, under certain circumstances, mutually recognize each 
other’s regulatory standards7 and comply with other members’ private rule-
making and commonly accepted technical standards.8 The approach of this 
Article is thus both descriptive, in that it seeks to map the phenomenon, as 
  
ever argues that since “pretty well all users of ‘transnational law’ discourse under-
stand this in the sense of ‘trans-state’ and, as such, from a theoretical perspective, it is 
arguable that nothing is lost to continue this convention.”  Id. at 866.  However, one 
might, to the contrast, also argue that attempting to achieve terminological precision 
might contribute to clarity of conceptual thinking.   
 5. The Westphalian model “conceived the nation-state to be the sole sovereign 
entity on the world stage.”  Robert A. Schapiro, In the Twilight of the Nation-State: 
Subnational Constitutions in the New World Order, 39 RUTGERS L.J. 801, 801 (2008); 
see also Michael Burgess & Hans Vollaard, Analysing Westphalian States in an Inte-
grating Europe and a Globalizing World, in STATE TERRITORIALITY AND EUROPEAN 
INTEGRATION 1 (Michael Burgess & Hans Vollaard  eds., 2006) 
 6. See Cassese, supra note 2, at 25. 
 7. See, e.g., World Trade Organization Agreement on the Application of Sani-
tary and Phytosantiary Measures, art. 4.1, Apr. 15, 1994 [hereinafter Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Measures Agreement] (requiring that members recognize other mem-
ber’s regulatory standards); Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade art. 6, Apr. 15, 
1994, Marrakesh Agreement of Establishing the World Trade Organization [hereinaf-
ter TBT] (ensuring that members accept the results of conformity procedures of other 
members, even if they differ from their own).  
 8. See, e.g., TBT, supra note 7, at art. 8 (requiring that members ensure that any 
of their non-governmental bodies comply with assessment procedures).  
3
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well as normative, in that it asks what could be done in view of the so per-
ceived reality.  Conversely, this Article does not focus on what should be 
dealt with in the national or the international sphere. 
II. MAPPING TRANS-TERRITORIAL RULE-MAKING 
A.  Background 
Executive rule-making takes place on multiple levels by international 
and supranational organizations, national government bodies, or by reference 
to standards set by private actors.  It can be created outside of a state, but it 
can also be the result of extra-territorial application of domestic law to situa-
tions located beyond the territory of the regulating state.  
Today’s de-territorialization of executive rule-making appears to have 
begun with increased regulation of conditions for cross-border trade and 
commerce.  This regulation was initially accomplished through international 
treaties such as the 1883 Paris Union Convention for the Protection of Indus-
trial Property9 or the 1886 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary 
and Artistic Work.10  Later, more encompassing treaty regimes such as the 
1948 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) emerged.11  In the 
1990s, a period of rapid growth and development of international structures 
brought GATT into the fold of the WTO.12   
In many respects the regulation of trade led to a spill-over of regulatory 
action into areas such as health and safety regulation, banking and insurance 
regulation, working conditions and labour regulation, taxation and distribu-
tion of tax powers, and protection of investments.  Another source of trans-
territorialization arose from the need to regulate consequences of activities 
which are not limited to territorially-defined political borders such as envi-
ronmental regulation and, to a certain degree, regulation of the Internet.13  
  
 9. 1883 Paris Union Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 
20, 1883, available at http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/paris/trtdocs_wo020.html.  
The Paris Union Convention required a certain degree mutual recognition of IP rights 
granted by other signatory states.  
 10. 1886 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Work, 
Sept. 9, 1886, available at http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/berne/trtdocs 
_wo001.html.  As the Paris Union Convention, the Berne Convention also required 
mutual recognition of the protection of intellectual property rights granted in other 
states party to the agreement. 
 11. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 55 U.N.T.S. 194.   
 12. Article XI of the 1994 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organization. 
 13. See, e.g., Hoi Kong, The Disaggregated State in Transnational Environ-
mental Regulation, 78 MO. L. REV. 443 (2013); Russell L. Weaver, Duncan Fair-
grieve & Francois Lichere, The Creation of Transnational Administrative Structures 
Governing Internet Communication, 78 MO. L. REV. 527 (2013). 
4
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Despite the many differences amongst the “trans-territorialized” regulatory 
regimes, they both generally have the capacity to exercise considerable influ-
ence in domestic administrative practice and decision-making.   
For reasons of clarity, the following mapping exercise of trans-territorial 
rule-making will first look at unilateral rule-making which transcends the 
territorial limitations of a jurisdiction with de jure or de facto trans-territorial 
effect.  It will then address trans-territorial rule-making by international orga-
nizations, standard setting, and rule-making by conditionality of financial aid 
by international banks. 
B.  Unilateral Rule-making with Trans-territorial Effect 
The applicability of the public law of one jurisdiction in another juris-
diction is set nationally in the context of what is known as “international ad-
ministrative law.”14  Despite the fact that such law is essentially national, it 
does have to comply with principles of public international law, especially the 
“links doctrine” as was developed in the wake of the International Court of 
Justice’s (ICJ) less than universally endorsed Nottebohm decision.15  This 
doctrine recognizes as connecting factors, the right to regulate situations hav-
ing a genuine or effective link to state powers, 16  such as those relating to 
territoriality, citizenship, and the right of self-organization.17   
Of those three factors, the most commonly applied factor in administra-
tive rule-making is the territoriality principle.  Under a strict reading of that 
principle, states – and supranational organizations such as the EU – cannot 
enact measures on the territory of another state without the latter’s consent.  
Positively formulated, the territoriality principle allows a state to exercise 
regulatory powers unilaterally with respect to all matters related to the terri-
tory, either (1) in the context of “subjective territoriality” – which provides a 
basis of jurisdiction over acts which originated within a foreign territory but 
were implemented or completed within the relevant state’s own territory – or 
(2) in the context of “objective territoriality” – a connecting factor in cases in 
  
 14. Kingsbury, Global Administrative Law, supra note 2, at 34. 
 15. Nottebohm Case (Liech. v. Guat.), 1955 I.C.J. 4 (Apr. 6).  
 16. In Nottebohm, the ICJ used the phrase “genuine connection[.]”  Id. at 23.  It 
is no accident that these links reflect the three-tiered definition of a state in public 
international law: the existence of a defined territory, a stable population and the 
possibility of exercising public power by means of autonomously organising some 
form of a government.  For further explanation, see James Crawford, The Criteria for 
Statehood in International Law, 48 BRITISH YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 93 
(1976-77).  
 17. FREDERICK ALEXANDER MANN, THE DOCTRINE OF INTERNATIONAL 
JURISDICTION REVISITED AFTER TWENTY YEARS 9 (1985); FREDERICK ALEXANDER 
MANN, THE DOCTRINE OF JURISDICTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 3 (1964); Piet Jan 
Slot & Eric Grabandt, Extraterritoriality and Jurisdiction, 23 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 
545 (1986). 
5
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which the affected activity originates within a state’s territory but is imple-
mented or carried to its conclusion abroad.  Thereby states have been apply-
ing their rules in an extra-territorial fashion.  Classic examples have been 
extra-territorial application of antitrust rules.18  Newer forms of extra-
territorial jurisdiction affect activities which by nature have no, or only little, 
physical contact with the territory of a jurisdiction such as telecommunica-
tions, and Internet law.19  
But there is another dimension to trans-territorialism of executive rule-
making.  Treaties under public international law may require “mutual recog-
nition” of rules set by other states.  Executive rule-making of one state can 
thereby become applicable by transfer from the law of one jurisdiction into 
that of another.  Voluntary mutual recognition schemes, which are not based 
on explicit obligations in international or supranational legal systems, include 
mutual recognition of decisions granting and withdrawing citizenship rights 
and the use of drivers’ licenses from other jurisdictions. Moreover, bilateral 
or multilateral free trade agreements or treaties on customs unions frequently 
contain obligations of mutual recognition of foreign regulatory standards as 
equivalent to national ones.  Where that is the case, a state or jurisdiction 
refusing to accept the regulatory approaches by others will have to prove that 
there are overriding concerns of public policy and that there exists a propor-
tionate approach to the non-acceptance of a rule.  The possible reasons for 
non-compliance with foreign law are pre-defined in WTO law and are gener-
ally related to public policy concerns regarding issues of health and safety, 
national security, and environmental protection to name just a few.20  These 
difficulties of unilateral rule-making with trans-territorial effect in a globaliz-
  
 18. See, e.g., Karl M. Meessen, Antitrust Jurisdiction Under Customary Interna-
tional Law, 78 AM. J. INT’L L. 783 (1984); see also United States v. Aluminum Co. of 
Am., 148 F.2d 416, 443-45 (2d Cir. 1945) (discussing the extraterritorial application 
of U.S. Antitrust Laws); Case T-102/96, Gencor Ltd. V. Comm’n, 1999 E.C.R. II-
00753, ¶¶ 123-27 (discussing the extraterritorial application of EU antitrust and 
merger control provisions). 
 19. For example, the 1988 International Telecommunication Regulations 
(ITRs) were developed at the 1988 World Administrative Telegraph and Tele-
phone Conference (WATTC-88) as supplement the International Telecommuni-
cation Convention with the objective of facilitating “global interconnection and 
interoperability” of trans-territorial telecommunications traffic.  They establish 
inter alia standards for international routing, charging, accounting and billing 
between operators and have been criticized for not sufficiently taking into ac-
count the non-territorial nature of the internet.  
 20. See, e.g., Appellate Body Report, European Communities-Measures Con-
cerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), ¶ 16, WT/DS26/AB/R, 
WT/DS48/AB/R (Jan. 16, 1998); Appellate Body Report, United States-Import 
Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 
1998).   
6
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ing world have led to an increasing demand for international organizations as 
arbiters and often standard setters.  
C.  Trans-territorial Rule-making by International Organizations 
Many international organizations have been granted rule-making powers 
and in some cases, even single case decision-making powers.  Such powers 
are conferred on traditional international organizations including as the al-
ready mentioned WTO.  At first glance the WTO appears to be an interna-
tional organization of this “classic” setting, with rules applicable between 
states and a small secretariat general administrating the treaty provisions.  
The WTO is, however, a highly judicialized organization by means of its 
sophisticated dispute settlement system.  Less visibly, the WTO has also set 
up standing committees to establish interpretative texts for the WTO agree-
ments.  These committees essentially engage in the equivalent of executive 
rule-making for further concretization of the more general WTO treaty provi-
sions.  An example of this is the WTO’s Committee on Sanitary and Phyto-
sanitary Measures (SPS Committee), which issues decisions on common un-
derstandings of the interpretation of SPS Agreement articles.21  Compliance 
with these interpretations will create the prima facie understanding of com-
pliance with the treaty obligations mostly related to the field of food, animal 
feed and plant health.  
Another example of rule-making by an organization under public inter-
national law is the International Labour Organization (ILO).  The ILO is 
composed of a General Conference of representatives of the member states; a 
“Governing Body” representing governments, employers, and workers; and, 
finally, an International Labour Office which in turn is controlled by the 
ILO’s Governing Body.22  When proposing standards in the form of recom-
mendations and conventions, the ILO acts as a de-facto rule-maker for labor 
standards and protection of fundamental rights of workers.23  However, inter-
  
 21. See, e.g., WTO SPS Committee Decision, Decision on the Implementation of 
Article 4 of the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Meas-
ures, G/SPS/19 (Oct. 24, 2001).  
 22. Elisabetta Morlino, Labour Standards: Forced Labour in Myanmar, in 
GLOBAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – CASES, MATERIALS, ISSUES 154-56 (Sabino Cassese 
et al. eds., 2d ed. 2008), available at www.iilj.org/GAL/documents 
/GALCasebook2008.pdf. 
 23. See, e.g., List of Instruments by Subject and Status, INTERNATIONAL LABOUR 
ORGANIZATION, http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:12030:0::NO (last 
visited Mar. 20, 2013) (listing standards in force).  Compliance with these standards is 
monitored by means of annual reports of the ILO member states.  ILO Constitution, 
art. 23-24, http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:62:0::NO:62:P62_LIST 
_ENTRIE_ID:2453907:NO (last visited Mar. 20, 2013).  The representation proce-
dure under which any industrial association of workers or employers can make repre-
sentations to the International Labour Office against any of the Member States is 
 
7
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national organizations exercising rule-making powers do not need to be pub-
lic.  Hybrid public-private forms of organizations on the transnational levels 
also exist.  For example, a hybrid public-private organization engaged in 
standard setting is the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers 
(ICANN), which is in charge of taking individual decisions on top-level do-
main name registration for the Internet.  Thus, implicit in ICANN’s opera-
tions is the exercise of rule-making powers concerning the distribution of top-
level domains.  ICANN, as a private body, is linked to public international 
law bodies, such as the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), 
through its dispute settlement system.24  Disputes involving Internet domain 
names are settled in the forum of the WIPO’s Arbitration and Mediation Cen-
ter.25  The hybrid public-private rule-making power of ICANN is apparent in 
the manner in which the WIPO’s Arbitration and Mediation Center uses stan-
dards established by ICANN as criteria for its arbitration decisions.  
Another example of a hybrid organization exercising rule-making func-
tions – at least for those who participate in a specific sport in the context of 
the international Olympic movement – is the International Olympic Commit-
tee (IOC), which is composed of various National Olympic Committees 
(NOC), each organized either as a private or public organization under the 
law of individual states.26  In addition to the IOC, the governing bodies of 
specific sports are often organized into international federations as well as 
regional and national sub-organizations.  Perhaps the most prominent exam-
ple of these governing bodies is found in soccer, which is governed by an 
international federation, the Federation Internationale de Football Association 
(FIFA), but also influenced by regional organizations, such as the Union of 
European Football Associations (UEFA) in Europe, and smaller national 
leagues.  These structures regulate rules of the games, create sanction regimes 
for rule violations standing independently from tort claims under national 
law, and define standards for national criminal law enforcement, such as in 
the context of doping.27 
The effect of rule-making by organizations which are organized under 
public international law vis-à-vis individuals depends upon whether the treaty 
provisions on which they are based establishes direct effect “within” the 
states that have signed it.  The courts of member states to a treaty organiza-
  
found in Article 24 of the ILO Constitution, and a complaints procedure under which 
one ILO member may file a complaint against another is found in Articles 26, 27, 28 
and 33 of the ILO Constitution.  See id.  
 24. See Bruno Carotti, Alternative Dispute Resolution: The ICANN’s Uniform 
Dispute Resolution Policy (UDRP), in GLOBAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – CASES, 
MATERIALS, ISSUES, supra note 22, at 154-56. 
 25. See id. 
 26. Lorenzo Casini, Hybrid Public-Private Bodies within Global Private Re-
gimes: The World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA), in GLOBAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW-
CASES, MATERIALS, ISSUES, supra note 22, at 37. 
 27. Id. 
8
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tion generally decide this unless, as in the case of the European Union (EU), 
the states have delegated the decision of this question to a common court.28  
Direct effect is established by national judges on the basis of whether the 
treaty parties wanted to confer rights and obligations on individuals – in 
which case a treaty may be “self executing” – or whether the treaty only in-
tended the state should be bound given, internally, the possibility to act dif-
ferently even if, externally, the state is risking that it would be obliged to pay 
damages or suffer other sanctions for non-compliance.29  The increasing plu-
rality of sources with trans-territorial effect have raised the question of direct 
effect to a highly contested phenomenon.  This contested question exists even 
where international treaties have their own quasi-judicial modes of interpret-
ing the treaty law and the obligations of parties.  Again, the WTO serves as a 
good example.  The case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union 
(CJEU), for example, denies direct effect of WTO law within the EU even in 
cases in which the WTO’s dispute settlement body has defined the content of 
the EU’s obligation under WTO law in a specific ruling.30  Next to the prom-
ulgation of “formal” international organizations active in the field of rule-
making, also less formalized hybrid structures exist which contribute by set-
ting standards for rule making and for mutual recognition.  
D.  Executive Rule-making by Standard Setting and the Creation of 
Conditionalities 
De-territorialized rule-making often exists in the form of “soft” standard 
setting.  Rather than as directly applicable hard law, soft standard setting al-
lows standardization on the transnational level to be undertaken by public 
bodies under public international law.  It can also be the result of either net-
works of national public actors or private and public-private hybrid bodies.  
Public bodies establishing standards include, for example, the Organization of 
Economic and Commercial Development (OECD) in Paris, an international 
organization in which states are members.  The OECD is active in establish-
ing model standards31 and best practice examples including the very influen-
tial draft bilateral tax agreements.32  An example of a network-based standard 
setting is the work of the International Competition Network (ICN), which is 
an organization of competition agencies throughout the world that exchange 
  
 28. See Consolidated Version of The Treaty on European Union, art. 19, Feb. 7, 
1992, 2010 C 83/13 O.J. (L 30.3).  
 29. See, e.g., JAN KLABBERS, INTERNATIONAL LAW 291-95 (2013). 
 30. See, e.g., Case C-377/02, Van Parys v. BIRB, 2005 E.C.R. I-1465.  
 31. See, e.g., ORG. ECON. & COMMERCIAL DEV., OECD STANDARD CODES FOR 
THE OFFICIAL TESTING OF AGRICULTURAL AND FORESTRY TRACTORS-2013 (2012), 
http://www.oecd.org/tad/code/General%20texts.pdf.  
 32. See, e.g., ORG. ECON. & COMMERCIAL DEV., MODEL AGREEMENT ON 
EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION ON TAX MATTERS (2002), http://www.oecd.org/tax 
/transparency/taxinformationexchangeagreementstieas.htm.  
9
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practices and concrete information about law enforcement activities in the 
field of antitrust.33  Such networks can function by developing standards on 
their own account or by weaving together publically set and privately set 
standards to form a hybrid product.  An illustrative example of such an ap-
proach is the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision  (BCBS), which is an 
influential gathering of top-level national and regional banking regulators.34  
The BCBS is a regulatory network that is thus not intergovernmental in na-
ture but might be more aptly described as an inter-agency network – albeit of 
central banks that are traditionally very independent agencies of a state.35  
This network’s key activity is the joint setting of standards in the form of 
guidelines for national and regional central banks.36  A particularly influential 
example thereof is the “International Convergence of Capital Measurement 
and Capital Standards,” developed in the form of the “Basel II” and successor 
“Basel III” standards, addressing regulation, supervision, and risk manage-
ment of the banking sector.37   
The Basel standards define criteria that private for-profit credit rating 
agencies must fulfill in order for their assessments to be used for regulatory 
purposes in the Basel rules on capital requirement for banks.38  The specific 
decisions of private for-profit companies – i.e., the credit rating agencies – 
are thus incorporated by reference into public regulatory standards.  This 
leads to an overall hybrid form of public-private regulation.  Initially “soft” 
standards of banking regulation, which are the basis for rating agency activ-
ity, thus become hardened through reference in public documents to the re-
sults of these very agency ratings.  
Further examples of such symbiotic relationships that have a significant 
impact on real life are evident in standards which can become binding by 
means of references in international treaty regimes, and therefore can estab-
lish obligations for their member states to comply with.  Returning to the 
aforementioned example of the WTO’s SPS agreement,  its Article 5.1 finds 
that “Member states shall ensure that their sanitary or phytosanitary measures 
  
 33. See About, INT’L COMPETITION NETWORK, http://www.internationa lcompeti-
tionnetwork.org/about.aspx (last visited Apr. 14, 2013). 
 34. They include representatives from central banks of Argentina, Australia, 
Belgium, Brazil, Canada, China, the EU, France, Germany, Hong Kong SAR, India, 
Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, Russia, Saudi 
Arabia, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United 
Kingdom, and the United States of America.  See Fact Sheet-Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision, BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, http://www.bis.org/about 
/factbcbs.htm (last visited Mar. 29, 2013).  
 35. Maurizia De Bellis, The Public Enforcement of Global Private Standard 
Setting: The Role of Credit Rating Agencies in Basel II, in GLOBAL ADMINISTRATIVE 
LAW – CASES, MATERIALS, ISSUES, supra note 22, at 23, 25. 
 36. See id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
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are based on an assessment, as appropriate to the circumstances, of the risks 
to human, animal or plant life or health, taking into account risk assessment 
techniques developed by the relevant international organizations.”39  The 
standards for such “assessment techniques” referred to in this paragraph are 
often established by other international organizations or networks of actors 
discussed above, such as the World Health Organization’s (WHO) codex 
alimentarius for food safety and food designation.   
A similar symbiotic relationship exists between obligations to other 
products.  For instance, Article 2.4 of the WTO Agreement on Technical Bar-
riers to Trade states that “where technical standards are required and relevant 
international standards exist or their completion is imminent, Members shall 
use them . . . .”40  Article 2.5 of the same agreement then continues, in its 
second sentence, to contribute to ‘hardening’ non-binding international stan-
dards by giving a strong incentive for compliance with them by stating that 
“[w]henever a technical regulation is prepared [by a WTO member state] . . . 
and is in accordance with relevant international standards, it shall be rebutta-
bly presumed not to create an unnecessary obstacle to international trade.”41 
Compliance with internationally recognized standards can therefore be highly 
advantageous for member states to the agreement.42    
A very different form of rule-making is exercised by international finan-
cial institutions such as the World Bank in Washington D.C. or the European 
Investment Bank in Luxembourg (EIB).43  Their regulatory powers arise from 
the possibility of linking financial benefits, such as obtaining a credit, with 
certain conditions.44  These conditions can deeply influence the political deci-
sion-making of national governments and even, in a sense, curtail the most 
sacred of rights traditionally wielded by parliaments: the budgetary powers.  
Because of the relevance of conditionality of loans to states can have for the 
legitimacy and accountability of public decision-making internal accountabil-
ity mechanisms are increasingly created, for example as complaint boards 
against the World Bank or EIB decisions regarding enforcement of the condi-
  
 39. Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures Agreement, supra note 7, at art. 5.1. 
 40. TBT, supra note 7, at art. 2.1. 
 41. Id. at art. 2.5. 
 42. One of the main sources of technical standards on the international level is 
the International Standardization Organization (ISO).  See About ISO, INT’L ORG. FOR 
STANDARDIZATION, http://www.iso.org/iso/home/about.htm (last visited Apr. 14, 
2013).  ISO is an international body composed of national and regional standard set-
ting organizations, some of which are organized under private law, and others of 
which are public bodies albeit with private participation.  Standards published by ISO 
are established through formalized procedures, commonly starting with the proposal 
of new work within a committee by one of its members but also including industry 
participation. 
 43. See generally MAARTJE VAN PUTTEN, POLICING THE BANKS: 
ACCOUNTABILITY MECHANISMS FOR THE FINANCIAL SECTOR (2008). 
 44. See id. at 33. 
11
Hofmann: Hofmann: Dealing with Trans-Territorial
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2013
File: HofmannPaginated.docx Created on:  10/27/13 4:48 PM Last Printed: 11/17/13 10:09 PM 
434 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 78  
 
tions.  Individuals, as well as public bodies, have the right to complain against 
recipients of funding from these banks who are non-compliant with the set 
conditions or with general principles of good governance.45  
III.  CONSEQUENCES ON RIGHTS AND INTERESTS OF INDIVIDUALS 
A. General Considerations 
The tentative mapping of trans-territorial executive rule-making activi-
ties demonstrates that in today’s world, the realms of what traditionally was 
distinguished as public international law, on one hand, and administrative 
law, on the other hand, are increasingly convergent.  Many international 
agreements and organizations are directly concerned with tasks of executive 
rule-making which transcends the territorial borders of jurisdictions.  Such 
transcending also takes place by means of mutual recognition or tolerated 
extra-territorial application of national law.  To date, no single overarching 
set of rules or principles has been established as the general guidelines for 
public international law, international administrative law, or any treaties or 
conventions between states which could function as body of “constitutional”-
type norms.   
Trans-territorial executive rule-making procedures and the underlying 
values are, as was illustrated by the examples discussed above, by contrast, 
established in the context of policy-specific sectoral agreements and net-
works.  These are often pragmatically developed to address the shortcomings 
of the very notion of territorially-bound public law of states.46  The prerequi-
  
 45. See, e.g., Daniel D. Bradlow, Private Complaints and International Organi-
zations: A Comparative Study of the Independent Inspection Mechanisms in Interna-
tional Financial Institutions, 36 GEO. J. INT’L L. 403, 405-06 (2005); Eisuke Suzuki & 
Suresh Nanwani, Responsibility of International Organizations: The Accountability 
Mechanisms of Multilateral Development Banks, 27 MICH. J. INT’L L. 177, 203-19 
(2005); Robert Hunter Wade, Accountability Gone Wrong: The World Bank, Non-
Governmental Organisations and the US Government in a Fight over China, 14 NEW 
POL. ECON. 25 (2009); see also EUR. INVESTMENT BANK, THE EIB COMPLAINTS 
MECHANISM (2010), http://www.eib.org/attachments/strategies/complaints 
_mechanism_policy_en.pdf (providing an explanation of the EIB Complaints Mecha-
nism). 
 46. They range from providing a framework for public action in the form of 
exchange of ideas and creating a forum for development of best practices to interna-
tional organisations with their own (quasi-) judicial review procedures and those with 
specific enforcement regimes.  Some organisations, like the WTO, are based on “tra-
ditional” public international law concepts of state membership and state obligations.  
This goes so far as to project the illusion found throughout the language of the WTO 
agreements of “states” actually being involved in international commerce instead of 
individuals.  Other forms of organizations, like the OECD, although traditionally 
established under public international law, are more akin to networks. Further, infor-
mal inter-agency networks, such as the international competition network, set infor-
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sites for the legality and legitimacy of trans-territorial rule-making activities 
become increasingly more relevant as international organizations, standard 
setting bodies, and mutual recognition regimes are becoming more relevant to 
individuals, while at the same time, the administrative law regimes of states 
are becoming increasingly internationalized.47  Through the above described 
direct or indirect channels, individuals find themselves subject to executive 
rule-making established outside the procedural and constitutional legal 
framework of their home jurisdiction.  This means that many important areas 
of regulatory activity can be removed from the traditional oversight mecha-
nisms of parliamentary control and judicial review which exist in the national 
context. The internationalization of regulatory regimes thus comes at a ‘price’ 
– I will address in the following three types of consequences which are, first, 
de-constitutionalization (B), the empowerment of the executive branch of 
powers (C) and the empowerment of experts (D).  
B.  De-constitutionalization 
The development of trans-territorial rule-making regimes also has the 
effect of de-constitutionalization of rule-making procedures by, for example, 
circumventing participatory forms of rule-making and transparency require-
ments enshrined in national law.48  The lack of overarching legal framework 
establishing values and principles, as well as serving as benchmark for ac-
ceptable procedures, is at the heart of de-constitutionalization through trans-
territorialization.  The question for trans-territorial rule-making is whether, 
and where, to look for alternative criteria of good executive rule-making pro-
cedures which would legitimize the trans-territorial effect of rule-making.  Of 
course, it would be naïve to expect a coherent hierarchically constructed set 
of constitutional norms, such as those citizens have become accustomed to in 
many national jurisdictions, for regulation of matters which now find them-
selves in the space in-between the purely national and the purely international 
(in the sense of the traditional notion of public international law as law be-
tween states).  The debate on the possibilities of constitutionalization of pub-
lic international law, or some of its regimes such as the WTO, is a sufficient 
  
mal soft law standards for interpretation and law enforcement of law. Privately organ-
ised bodies are relevant to the notion of trans-territorial regulation such as was dis-
cussed above in the context of domain name registration through ICANN. 
 47. See  VAN PUTTEN, supra note 43, at 3 (discussing the spread of globaliza-
tion).  
 48. Annette Elisabeth Toeller & Herwig C.H. Hofmann, Democracy and the 
Reform of Comitology, in DELEGATED LEGISLATION AND THE ROLE OF COMMITTEES IN 
THE EC 25, 30 (Mads Andenæs & Alexander Türk eds., 2000); Michel Rosenfeld, 
Constitutional Versus Administrative Ordering in an Era of Globalization and Priva-
tization: Reflections on Sources of Legitimation in the Post-Westphalian Polity, 32 
CARDOZO L. REV. 2339, 2339, 2351 (2011); Fritz W. Scharpf, Economic Integration, 
Democracy and the Welfare State, 4 J. EUR. PUB. POL’Y 18, 27-29 (1997). 
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reminder as to the attractiveness of the goal as well as the difficulties associ-
ated with achieving it.49  One of the problems that is evident when debating 
the constitutionalization of public international law based regimes is that 
there are obviously many different understandings of what would legitimately 
constitute a constitution.50  To some, constitutionalization means establishing 
a framework of ‘higher’ legal principles.  But the very absence of an identifi-
able constitutional foundation also gives rise to specific questions of account-
ability and legitimacy of regulatory activity beyond the territorially bound 
state.  To others, the notion of a negotiated approach of rule-making, devel-
oped in a dialogue between different systems standing in non-hierarchic rela-
tions, carries in itself the core of a discursive approach leading to an outcome 
in some ways legitimated by deliberative elements.51  Such forum for delib-
erative intervention could serve as a constitutional forum. 
More generally speaking, however, although, no policy-specific regime 
equals another, the values pursued under the heading of ‘constitutionaliza-
tion’ can generally be described to include notions of accountability, trans-
parency, democratic participation, and procedural justice in both the exercise 
of public functions and the protection of the rule of law.52  Whether such val-
ues are protected in the context of trans-territorial executive cooperation or 
the delegation of powers to the international level depends on several factors 
generally related to the “hardening” of the legal regimes and the introduction 
of independent mechanisms of review and sanctioning.53  The language of 
  
 49. See, e.g., JAN KLABBERS, ANNE PETERS & GEIR ULFSTEIN, THE 
CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 11 (2009); Ernst-Ulrich Peters-
mann, Constitutionalism and WTO Law: From a State-Centered Approach Towards a 
Human Rights Approach in International Economic Law, in THE POLITICAL 
ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW 32, 34 (Daniel L.M. Kennedy & James D. 
Southwick eds., 2002) (providing a more specific reference to the WTO).    
 50. For excellent discussions in a book which has unfortunately only gained little 
recognition in the literature – maybe due to its inclusion into a series of “international 
studies in the theory of private law” – see TRANSNATIONAL GOVERNANCE AND 
CONSTITUTIONALISM (Christian Joerges, Inger-Johanne Sand & Gunther Teubner eds., 
2004); see also Gunther Teubner, Societal Constitutionalism: Alternatives to State-
Centred Constitutional Theory?, in TRANSNATIONAL GOVERNANCE AND 
CONSTITUTIONALISM, surpa, at 3, 4-10; Christoph Möllers, Transnational Governance 
Without a Public Law?, in TRANSNATIONAL GOVERNANCE AND CONSTITUTIONALISM, 
surpa, at 329, 337. 
 51. See, e.g., Jens Steffek, Sources of Legitimacy Beyond the State: A View from 
International Relations, in TRANSNATIONAL GOVERNANCE AND CONSTITUTIONALISM, 
supra note 50, at 81, 81-83, 100-01 (detailing further references also from the legal-
sociological and political science debate).   
 52. See Louis J. Virelli III, Science, Politics, and Administrative Legitimacy, 78 
MO. L. REV. 511, 515 (2013). 
 53. Kalypso Nicolaidis & Gregory Schaffer, Transnational Mutual Recognition 
Regimes: Governance without Global Government, 68 L. & CONTEMPORARY 
PROBLEMS 263 (2005). 
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such approaches is related to legal notions valuing legal certainty over diplo-
matic negotiations.54  In that sense, one of the central factors that appears to 
be influencing the real effect of trans-territorial rule-making is whether an 
international regime directly or indirectly confers rights and obligations on 
individuals.55  If an act of trans-territorial rule-making has such effect, it will 
generally be of much higher significance to individuals. Further factors for 
relevance to individuals are also whether an agreement regulates itself or 
whether it – by means of cross referencing – makes more or less binding 
standards or by hybrid forms of rule-making.  
Whether the procedure leading to an act of transnational rule-making di-
rectly or indirectly protects individual rights therefore might be regarded to 
depend both on the procedure provided for in the rule-making regime and the 
procedural standards which, in the alternative, would be applicable on the 
national level.  In some cases, international rule-making might offer higher 
standards than the national approach, while with regard to other countries, it 
might not.  Whether an individual living in a system with a high protection of 
individual rights should contend with a lowering of the standards of proce-
dural rights offered to her or him by an international regime is a complex 
question. It relates to how participatory government and transparency of a 
legal system are valued.  It also relates to the question whether the potential 
specific values purported by a rule-making regimes such as having environ-
mental or trade benefits spread to a greater amount of individuals around the 
world, outweigh the potential reduction of individual influence on specific 
rules as a consequence of the spreading of trans-territorial rule-making.  
Where trans-territorial rule-making activities develop direct effect, the 
question might be whether it would be possible to protect individual rights in 
the procedure of rule-making, at the rule-making level, through internal con-
trol and balance mechanisms that can be independently reviewed.  These 
internal controls are the strongest when individuals have rights of access and 
can ensure remedies.56  Also, where there is no  court-like structure, internal 
accountability mechanisms such as those developed by the World Bank or the 
EIB can serve as examples of internal control.57  With the effective estab-
  
 54. J.H.H. Weiler, The Rule of Lawyers and the Ethos of Diplomats: Reflections 
on the Internal and External Legitimacy of WTO Dispute Settlement (Harvard Jean 
Monnet Working Paper 9/00). 
 55. Jan Klabbers, supra note 29, at 292. 
 56. An interesting example from the realm of public international law based 
regimes includes the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR).  See Bonnie H. 
Weinstein, Recent Decisions from the European Court of Human Rights, AM. SOC. OF 
INT’L LAW (May 2000), http://www.asil.org/insigh45.cfm.  
 57. See Complaints Mechanism, EURO. INV. BANK, http://www.eib.org/about 
/accountability/complaints/index.htm (last visited Mar. 20, 2013) (detailing EIB inter-
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lishment of consequences for a finding of wrongdoing, the persuasive effect 
of rules might grow, and with it, the role of the rule of law over diplomatic 
negotiations.   
An alternative might be the protection of rights on the “enforcement”-
level, which is often the state level.  This might be especially relevant in cases 
of failure of the decision-making level to comply with basic requirements of 
the rule of law, of procedural justice, or of fundamental rights.58  The chal-
lenge has been described well by Joerges who states: 
[T]ransnational governance poses fundamental challenges for all 
international legal disciplines and their commitments to constitu-
tional democracies; if, and, indeed, because transnational govern-
ance emerges beyond the realms that states can control, it poses a 
threat to the type of legitimacy that the citizens of constitutional 
states feel entitled to expect. And the search for legitimate transna-
tional governance would be hopeless if legitimacy were equated 
with the type of demos-anchored constitutionalism that nation 
states have established.59  
The question thus appears very much to be a question of the pluralism of 
legal orders resulting in a mutual control between regimes – be they on the 
international or the national levels. 
C.  Empowerment of the Executive 
This discussion, however, is in itself a case in piont of the fact that the 
development of trans-territorial rule-making strengthens the role of the execu-
tive branch of powers vis-à-vis political supervision through parliamentary 
  
ml (last visited Mar. 20, 2013) (detailing World Bank’s internal accountability 
mechanisms). 
 58. An example of this is the non-enforcement in the EU of UN security council 
decisions on what the UN in self-congratulatory fashion called “smart” sanctions 
directed against individuals in absence of a regime sufficiently protecting the rights of 
individuals or granting guarantees of minimum procedural justice.  See joined Cases 
C-402/05 P, Kadi v. Council of the Eur. Union., and C-415/05 P, Al Barakaat Int’l 
Found. v. Council of the Euro. Union, 2008 E.C.R. I-06351; Case C-402/05 P (Opin-
ion of Advocate General), Kadi v. Council of the Eur. Union, 2008 E.C.R. I-06351; 
Case C-415/05 P (Opinion of Advocate General), Al Barakaat Int’l Found. v. Council 
of the Euro. Union and Comm’n of the Euro. Cmtys., 2008 E.C.R. I-06351.  The case 
has led to a rich academic discussion which is impossible to fully cite here.  See, e.g., 
Grainne de Búrca, The ECJ and the International Legal Order: A Re-Evaluation, in 
THE WORLDS OF EUROPEAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 105, 107 (Grainne de Búrca & 
J.H.H. Weiler eds., 2012).  
 59. Christian Joerges, Constitutionalism and Transnational Governance: Explor-
ing a Magic Triangle, in TRANSNATIONAL GOVERNANCE AND CONSTITUTIONALISM, 
supra note 50, at 339, 340. 
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and other forms of oversight including judicial review.  Furthering of inde-
pendence of the executive branch of powers can be regarded as an implicit 
result of executive actors re-constituting themselves in international net-
works.  Given that traditionally, in western democracies, the international 
relations are a prerogative of the executive branch of powers,60 internationali-
zation of regulatory action can also be a form of self-liberalization of the ex-
ecutive.  By expanding means of trans-territorial action, the executive branch 
of government is thus working towards allowing for an effective exercise of 
powers.   
However, public law arguably is destined to establish more than just 
forms of effective action, as an equally, if not more, important measure exists 
in the form of the twin goal of protection of individual rights.  The question is 
how principles, procedural rules, and mechanisms designed to ensure the rule 
of law, legality, accountability, transparency, and participation can be 
achieved.  These issues bring back the question of constitutionalization or the 
procedural protection of values generally enshrined in public law regimes 
under the rule of law.  This shift of powers towards the executive branch is 
also reflected in the fact that matters traditionally treated as public interna-
tional law have been the realm of diplomats.61  Further, “high policy” has 
increasingly been brought to the area of administrative law and described as a 
“transition from diplomacy to law,” especially in cases in which administra-
tive law regimes are equipped with strong dispute settlement mechanisms.62 
D.  Empowerment of Experts 
The shift of powers towards the executive branches of power is only part 
of the story. With increasing importance of references to standards set by 
experts assembled under the auspices of self-regulation or of expert panels of 
international organizations,63 one might claim that we are not only witness-
ing, on the international level, a transition from the rule of diplomats to law-
yers, but also to technical experts.  The real-life reason is that what might not 
be possible to achieve on a national level due to the highly political nature of 
a measure, might through the veil of expertise-driven international regulation, 
become palatable to the national audience.  One of the answers to the problem 
of finding an acceptable balance between differing regulatory levels or phi-
losophies of risk-regulation in international trade as well as often in national 
  
 60. See Parliament and Democracy in the Twenty-First Century: A Guide to 
Good Practice, INTER-PARLIAMENTARY UNION (2006), http://www.ipu.org/dem-
e/guide-7.htm.  
 61. See id.  
 62. J.H.H. Weiler, The Role of Lawyers and the Ethos of Diplomats: Reflections 
on the Internal and External Legitimacy of WTO Dispute Resolution, 35 J.WORLD 
TRADE 191, 192-97, 200 (2001).  
 63. See supra part II.D. 
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legal systems has been to reduce the power of political executives by refer-
ring to the presumably “neutral” forum of experts.64   
How does this ethos of expertise, as one might refer to it, influence the 
notion of executive rule-making in the context of de-territorialized exercise of 
public powers, and what is the role of law in the area of de-territorialized 
executive rule-making? In an ideal world, experts would be guarantors of 
independence and virtue by being recognized as complying with and acting 
according to the scientific method, epistemic values and the professional 
ethos of scientific work.  This optimistic, even idealistic, account is, of 
course, not what the reality holds out for regulatory regimes.  Similar to na-
tional law, where the approach to referring to technical standards is also an 
important phenomenon, three of the central questions are: How to address the 
reality of scientific uncertainty and justifiably differing opinions within the 
scientific community? Who is going to be represented?  Who asks the ques-
tions and sets the agendas for the experts to address?   
Solutions to these types of questions could be imagined by mixing the 
models, of purely expertise-based decision making with more broad pluralist 
participation in order to attempt to counter-balance disadvantages associated 
with each. Difficulties, of adding participatory procedures outside of the na-
tional context, however, exist. These include the questions how participatory 
procedures could be designed in which stake-holders are sufficiently aware of 
the legal framework and will not experience problems of access to informa-
tion and active participation due to language problems. Addressing these 
problems on a national scale is already not easy. Trying to develop such mod-
els on a scale involving all interests which are outside of the deciding juris-
diction has the potential to multiply these difficulties. 
IV. SOME CONCLUSIONS 
As a result of the aforementioned consequences, one might infer that the 
more the individual rights or economic interests of the parties subject to rule-
making are affected, the more it might be relevant to ensure compliance with 
basic constitutional values such as the principle of legality, proportionality, 
accountability, transparency, rights of defense, and rights of participation, to 
name a few.  These values should not be made subject or victim of the de-
territorialization of executive rule-making procedures.   
Administrations either seeking to enhance effectiveness of their activi-
ties through delegation of powers to bodies outside their jurisdictions or en-
gaging in international cooperation should ensure that the exercise of these 
  
 64. For instance, the Global Forest Expert Panels, launched in 2007, provides 
“independent scientific assessments of key issues in order to support more informed 
decision-making at the global level.”  Global Forest Expert Panels, INT’L UNION OF 
FOREST RESEARCH ORGS., http://www.iufro.org/science/gfep/ (last visited Mar. 20, 
2013).  
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powers does not compromise fundamental values.  One possible approach 
might be to consider creating an international instrument similar to the Vi-
enna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969, however, one which would 
not deal with interpretation of international treaties, but would instead address 
rule-making on the trans-national level.   
A convention of this nature could establish minimum procedural rules 
for the setting of rules and standards by international organizations and stan-
dard setters.  Examples of such rules exist.  They are formulated in language 
and contain content similar to existing national administrative codes.  For 
instance, the WTO Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT), in an-
nex 3 to Article 4.1 establishes a “Code of Good Practice for the Preparation, 
Adoption and Application of Standards.”65  This code states, inter alia, that 
standards need to be announced in a publically available work program and 
that “[b]efore adopting a standard, the standardizing body shall allow a period 
of at least 60 days for the submission of comments on the draft standard by 
interested parties.”66  It continues to define the extent and conditions of the 
notification as well as rules on the use of responses obtained.  A “body shall 
take into account, in the further processing of the standard, the comments 
received during the period for commenting” and respondents shall have a 
right to an “explanation why a deviation from relevant international standards 
is necessary.”67  The TBT provisions are not the only example. Another is the 
Aarhus Convention,68 which in Article 8 on “public participation during the 
preparation of executive regulations and/or generally applicable legally bind-
ing normative instruments” sets out minimum standards for public participa-
tion in executive rule-making through a notice and comment style proce-
dure.69   
These examples might be criticized for containing only a basic frame-
work.  However, it is important to note that these examples show that proce-
dural rules on rule-making procedures are beginning to emerge on the inter-
national level.  The challenge now is to analyze the possibility of generalizing 
some of their approaches across policy sectors.  Even if one were not to 
achieve an international convention on trans-territorial rule-making, the 
  
 65. Code of Good Practice for the Preparation, Adoption and Application of 
Standards, TBT, supra note 7, at Annex 3.   
 66. Id.  
 67. Id.  
 68. UNITED NATIONS ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR EUROPE CONVENTION ON 
ACCESS TO INFORMATION, PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN DECISION-MAKING AND ACCESS 
TO JUSTICE IN ENVIRONMENTAL MATTERS (1998), available at 
http://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/env/pp/documents/cep43e.pdf.  The Aarhus 
Convention is a multilateral agreement on procedural rules to be adopted by its signa-
tories in the field of environmental regulation and access to documents and informa-
tion by individuals. Its signatories include many European states and the EU. 
 69. Id.  
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learned legal community might be able to begin distilling requirements for 
legitimate trans-territorial rule-making from these and similar examples. 
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